uudelleen se, mitä filosofi sanoi). Filosofit esittävät uusia käsitteitä, he asettavat niitä näytteille, mutta he eivät esitä – ainakaan täydellisesti – niitä ongelmia, joihin nämä käsitteet vastaavat. Esimerkiksi Hume esittää omaperäisen uskon käsitteen, mutta hän ei sano, miten ja miksi tiedon ongelma asettuu siten, että tieto on uskon määrätty muoto. Filosofian historian ei pidä esittää, mitä filosofi sanoo, vaan se, mitä hän välttämättä ilmaisee rivien välissä, se, mitä hän ei sanonut, mutta joka on kuitenkin läsnä hänen sanomassaan.

Filosofia on aina käsitteiden keksimistä. En ole koskaan piitannut metafysiikan ylittämisestä tai filosofian kuolemasta. Filosofialla on tehtävä, käsitteiden luominen, joka pysyy täydellisen ajankohtaisena. Mikään ei voi tehdä sitä filosofian asemesta. Filosofialla on tietysti aina ollut kilpailijansa Platonin "kilpakumppaneista" Zarathustran ilveilijään. Nykyään tietojenkäsittely, kommunikaatio ja kaupallinen mainonta omivat sanat "käsite" ja "luova", ja nämä "ideoijat" muodostavat julkean rodun, joka esittää myyntitapahtuman kapitalismin ylimpänä ajatuksena, kauppatavaran *cogitona*. Filosofia tuntee itsensä pieneksi ja yksinäiseksi tällaisten voimien edessä, mutta jos filosofia sattuisi kuolemaan, ainakin se kuolisi nauruun.

Filosofia ei ole kommunikoivaa, sen paremmin kuin mietiskelevää tai reflektiivistä: se on luonteeltaan luovaa tai jopa vallankumouksellista niin kauan, kuin se luo uusia käsitteitä. Ainoa edellytys on, että uudet käsitteet ovat välttämättömiä ja outoja, ja että ne ovat tällaisia siinä määrin, jossa ne vastaavat oikeisiin ongelmiin. Käsite estää ajattelua väistämättä olemasta pelkkä mielipide, näkökulma, keskustelua tai jutustelua. Jokainen käsite on välttämättä paradoksi. Yritimme Félix Guattarin kanssa tehdä filosofiaa *L'anti-Œdipessa* ja *Mille plateaux'ssa*, ennen kaikkea *Mille plateaux'ssa*, joka on paksu kirja ja joka ehdottaa monia käsitteitä. Emme tehneet

yhteistyötä, vaan me teimme kirjan ja sitten toisen, mutta emme ykseyden mielessä, vaan epämääräisen artikkelin mielessä. Meillä oli kummallakin menneisyytemme ja aiemmin tehdyt työt: Félixillä psykiatriassa, politiikassa ja filosofiassa. Hän oli jo täynnä käsitteitä. Minä olin tehnyt *Différence et répétitionin* ja *Logique du sensin*. Mutta me emme tehneet yhteistyötä kahtena henkilönä. Olimme pikemmin kuin kaksi puroa, jotka yhtyivät muodostaakseen "jonkin" kolmannen, joka tulisi olemaan me. Yksi "filosofian" kysymyksistä on aina ollut: kuinka tulkita *filo*? Oma filosofia, se muodosti siis toisen periodini, joka ei olisi koskaan alkanut eikä onnistunut ilman Félixiä.

Oletetaan seuraavaksi, että on olemassa kolmas jakso, jossa on mielestäni kyse maalauksesta ja elokuvasta, kuvista toiminnassa, mutta tämän jakson työt ovat silti filosofiankirjoja. Mielestäni käsitteellä on kaksi muuta ulottuvuutta, perseptin ja affektin ulottuvuus. Juuri nämä kiinnostavat minua, eivät niinkään kuvat. Perseptit eivät ole aistivaikutelmia, vaan ne ovat aistimus- ja suhdepaketteja, jotka säilyvät elossa niissä, jotka kokevat niitä. Eivätkä affektit ole tunteita, vaan ne ovat muutoksia *(devenir)*, jotka ylittävät muutosten kautta kulkevien voimat (hän muuttuu toiseksi). Suuret englantilaiset tai amerikkalaiset romaanikirjailijat kirjoittavat usein perseptien kautta, ja Kleist ja Kafka affektien kautta. Affekti, persepti ja käsite ovat kolme erottamatonta voimaa, jotka kulkevat taiteesta filosofiaan ja päinvastoin. Kaikista vaikein on varmasti musiikki, *Mille plateaux'ssa* on yksi analyysiluonnos: kertosäe tempaa mukaansa nuo kolme voimaa. Yritimme tehdä kertosäkeestä yhden pääkäsitteistämme suhteessa territorioon ja Maahan, pieneen ja suureen kertosäkeeseen. Mutta loppujen lopuksi kaikki nämä periodit jatkuvat toisiinsa ja sekoittuvat, näen sen nyt paremmin Leibniz-

7
Perception in the folds

I *must* have a body, it's a moral necessity, a 'requirement.' And in the first place, I must have a body because an obscure object lives in me. But, right from this first argument, Leibniz's originality is tremendous. He is not saying that only the body explains what is obscure in the mind. To the contrary, the mind is obscure, the depths of the mind are dark, and this dark nature is what explains and requires a body. We can call 'primary matter' our passive power or the limitation of our activity: we say that our primary matter requires extension, but also resistance or antitype, and yet an individuated requirement to possess a body that belongs to us.[1] It is because there is an infinity of individual monads that each one requires an individuated body, this body resembling the shadow of other monads cast upon it. Nothing obscure lives in us because we have a body, but we must have a body because there is an obscure object in us. In the place of Cartesian physical induction Leibniz substitutes a moral deduction of the body.

But this first argument gives way to another, which seems to contradict it, and which is even more original. This time, we must have a body because our mind possesses a favored – clear and distinct – zone of expression. Now it is the clear zone that is the requirement for having a body. Leibniz will go as far as stating that what I express clearly is what 'relates to my body.'[2] And in effect, if the monad Caesar clearly expresses the crossing of the Rubicon, is it not because the river maintains a relation of proximity with his body? The same holds for all other monads whose zone of clear expression coincides with the body's immediate environment.

There we nonetheless find an inversion of causality – justifiable in

certain respects – that must not impede our putting together the real order of deduction: (1) each monad condenses a certain number of unique, incorporeal, ideal events that do not yet put bodies in play, although they can only be stated in the form, 'Caesar crosses the Rubicon, he is assassinated by Brutus ...'; (2) these unique events included in the monad as primary predicates constitute its zone of clear expression, or its 'subdivision'; (3) they necessarily relate to a body that belongs to this monad, and are incarnated in bodies that act immediately upon it. In brief, it is *because* every monad possesses a clear zone that it must have a body, this zone constituting a relation with the body, not a given relation, but a genetic relation that engenders its own 'relatum.' It is because we have a clear zone that we must have a body charged with traveling through it or exploring it, from birth to death.

Here we confront two difficulties. Why is the requirement of having a body sometimes based on a principle of passivity, in obscurity and confusion, but at others on our activity, on clarity and distinction? And more particularly, how does the existence of the body derive from the clear and distinct? As Arnauld states, how can what I express clearly and distinctly have anything to do with my body, the sum of whose movements are known only in obscurity?[3]

Singularities proper to each monad are extended as far as the singularities of others and in all senses. Every monad thus expresses the entire world, but obscurely and dimly because it is finite and the world is infinite. That is why the lower depths of the monad are so dark. Since it does not exist outside of the monads that convey it, the world is included in each one in the form of perceptions or 'representatives,' *present and infinitely minute elements*.[4] Still again, since the monad does not exist outside of other monads, these are minute perceptions lacking an object, that is, hallucinatory microperceptions. The world exists only in its representatives as long as they are included in each monad. It is a lapping of waves, a rumor, a fog, or a mass of dancing particles of dust. It is a state of death or catalepsy, of sleep, drowsiness, or of numbness. It is as if the depths of every monad were made from an infinity of tiny folds (inflections) endlessly furling and unfurling in every direction, so that the monad's spontaneity resembles that of agitated sleepers who twist and turn on their mattresses.[5]

Microperceptions or representatives of the world are these little folds that unravel in every direction, folds in folds, over folds, following folds, like

one of Hantaï's paintings, or one of Clérambault's toxic hallucinations.[6] And these are minute, obscure, confused perceptions that make up our macroperceptions, our conscious, clear, and distinct apperceptions. Had it failed to bring together an infinite sum of minute perceptions that destabilize the preceding macroperception while preparing the following one, a conscious perception would never happen. How could a pain follow a pleasure if a thousand tiny pains or, rather, half-pains were not already dispersed in pleasure, which will then be united in conscious pain? However abruptly I may flog my dog who eats his meal, the animal will have experienced the minute perceptions of my stealthy arrival on tiptoes, my hostile odor, and my lifting of the rod that subtend the conversion of pleasure into pain. How could a feeling of hunger follow one of satisfaction if a thousand tiny, elementary forms of hunger (for salts, for sugar, butter, etc.) were not released at diverse and indiscernible rhythms? And inversely, if satisfaction follows hunger, it is through the sating of all these particular and imperceptible hungers.

Tiny perceptions are as much the passage from one perception to another as they are components of each perception. They constitute the animal or animated state par excellence: disquiet. These are 'pricklings,' or little foldings that are no less present in pleasure than in pain. The pricklings are the representative of the world in the closed monad. The animal that anxiously looks about, or the soul that watches out, signifies that there exist minute perceptions that are not integrated into present perception, but also minute perceptions that are not integrated into the preceding one and that nourish the one that comes along ('so it was that!').

The *macroscopic* distinguishes perceptions, and appetites that are the passage from one perception to another. Such is the condition of great composite folds, or draped forms. But the *microscopic* level no longer distinguishes minute perceptions and minute inclinations: pricklings of anxiety render all perception unstable.[7] The theory of minute perceptions is based thus on two causes: a metaphysical cause, according to which every perceptive monad conveys an infinite world that it contains; a psychological cause, according to which every conscious perception implies this infinity of minute perceptions that prepare, compose, or follow it. *From the cosmological to the microscopic. but also from the microscopic to the macroscopic.*

The task of perception entails pulverizing the world, but also one of spiritualizing its dust.[8] The point is one of knowing how we move from

minute perceptions to conscious perceptions, or from molecular perceptions to molar perceptions. Is it through a process of totalization, when for instance I grasp a whole whose parts are imperceptible to me? Thus I apprehend the sound of the sea, or of an assembly of people, but not the murmur of each wave or person who nonetheless is part of each whole. But, although Leibniz states the point in terms of totality, the question involves something other than a sum of homogenous parts.[9] We are not dealing with a relation of parts-and-wholes because the totality can be as imperceptible as the parts, as also when I *do not* sense the grinding noise of the water mill to which I am overly accustomed. And a buzzing or a deadening effect are wholes without necessarily being perceptions.

In truth, Leibniz never fails to specify that the relation of the inconspicuous perceptions to conscious perception does not go from part to whole, but from the *ordinary* to what is *notable* or *remarkable*. 'There are countless inconspicuous perceptions, which do not stand out enough for one to be aware of or to remember them.'[10] We have to understand literally – that is, mathematically – that a conscious perception is produced when at least two heterogenous parts enter into a differential relation that determines a singularity. It works thus in the equation of circumferences in general:

$$ydy + xdx = 0, \text{ or } \frac{dy}{dx} = -\frac{x}{y}$$

expresses a determinable magnitude. For example, the color green: yellow and blue can surely be perceived, but if their perception vanishes by dint of progressive diminution, they enter into a differential relation

$$(\frac{db}{dy})$$

that determines green. And nothing impedes either yellow or blue, each on its own account, from being already determined by the differential relation of two colors that we cannot detect, or of two degrees of chiaroscuro:

$$\frac{dy}{dx} = Y$$

Such is the case of hunger, where a lack of sugar, butter, etc., engages differential relations that determine hunger as something notable or remarkable. For example, the sound of the sea: at least two waves must be minutely perceived as nascent and heterogenous enough to become part of a relation that can allow the perception of a third, one that 'excels' over the others and comes to consciousness (implying that we are near the shoreline). For example, the position of the sleeper: all the little bends and tiny creases engage relations that produce an attitude, a habitus, and a great sinuous fold as a good position that can bring all of them together. 'Good' macroscopic form always depends on microscopic processes.

All consciousness is a matter of threshold. In each case we would probably have to state why the threshold is marked where it is. Yet if we take thresholds to be so many minimal units of consciousness, tiny perceptions are in each instance smaller than the virtual minimum and, in this sense, are infinitely small. *The ones selected in each order are those engaged in differential relations,* and hence they produce the quality that issues forth at the given threshold of consciousness (for example, the color green). Inconspicuous perceptions are thus not parts of conscious perception, but requisites or genetic elements, 'differentials of consciousness.' Even more than Fichte, Salomon Maïmon – the first post-Kantian who returns to Leibniz – draws all the consequences from this kind of psychic automatism of perception. Far from having perception presuppose an object capable of affecting us, and conditions in which we would be apt to be affected, the reciprocal determination of the differentials

$$(\frac{dy}{dx})$$

brings about the complete determination of the object as a perception, and the determinability of space-time as a condition. Beyond the Kantian method of conditioning, Maïmon restores an internal subjective method of genesis: between red and green there is given an empirically outer difference, but also an inner concept of difference such that 'the mode of the differential makes up the particular object, and the relations of differentials the relations among different objects.'[11] The physical object and mathematical space both refer to a transcendental (differential and genetic) psychology of perception. Space-time ceases to be a pure given in order to become the totality or the nexus of differential relations in the

subject, and the object itself ceases to be an empirical given in order to become the product of these relations in conscious perception. Thus there exist Ideas of understanding, the color green as a quality being as much the actualization of an eternal Object or Idea in the subject as a given figure is a determination of space.

If, with Kant, it is objected that such a conception reintroduces infinite understanding, we might be impelled to remark that the infinite is taken here only as the presence of an unconscious in finite understanding, of something that cannot be thought in finite thought, of a nonself in the finite self, the presence that Kant will himself be forced to discover when he will hollow out the difference between a determinant and a determinable self. For Maïmon, as for Leibniz, reciprocal determination of differentials does not refer to a divine understanding, but to tiny perceptions as representatives of the world in the finite self (the relation with infinite understanding devolves from it, and not the inverse). The infinite present in the finite self is exactly the position of Baroque equilibrium or disequilibrium.

Now we can understand how the same argument can appeal to both obscurity and clarity. It is because for Leibniz clarity comes of obscurity and endlessly is plunging back into it. Thus the Cartesian map of darkness-clarity-confusion-distinction is redrawn with an entirely new meaning and new set of relations. Inconspicuous perceptions constitute the obscure dust of the world, the dark depths every monad contains. There are differential relations among these presently infinitely small ones that are *drawn into clarity;* that is to say, that establish a clear perception (the color green) with certain tiny, dark, evanescent perceptions (the colors yellow and blue). And no doubt yellow and blue can themselves be clear and conscious perceptions, but only if they too are drawn into clarity, each from its own position, by differential relations among other minute perceptions, or differentials of other orders. *Differential relations always select minute perceptions that play a role in each case,* and bring to light or clarify the conscious perception that comes forth. Thus differential calculus is the psychic mechanism of perception, the automatism that at once and inseparably plunges into obscurity and determines clarity: a selection of minute, obscure perceptions and a perception that moves into clarity.

An automatism of this kind has to be taken in two ways, universally and individually. On the one hand, insofar as the same world is included

in all existing monads, the latter offer the same infinity of minute perceptions, and the same differential relations that yield in them strangely similar conscious perceptions. All monads thus perceive the same green color, the same note, the same river, and in every case a single and same eternal object is actualized in them. Yet, on the other hand, actualization is different for each monad. Never do two monads perceive the same green in the same degree of chiaroscuro. It could be said that every monad favors certain differential relations that hereafter confer on it exclusive perceptions; that the monad leaves other relations below the necessary degree; or, further, that it lets an infinity of minute perceptions subsist in it without at all assuming relations. At the limit, then, all monads possess an infinity of compossible minute perceptions, but have differential relations that will select certain ones in order to yield clear perceptions proper to each. In this way every monad, as we have seen, expresses the same world as the others, but nonetheless owns an exclusive zone of clear expression that is distinguished from every other monad: its *subdivision.*

These subdivisions appear even if we adhere to orders of clarity and distinction in Leibniz's classification of ideas. Contrary to Descartes, Leibniz begins in darkness. Clarity emerges from obscurity by way of a genetic process, and so too clarity plunges into darkness, and continues to plunge deeper and deeper: it is natural chiaroscuro, a development out of obscurity, and it is *more or less* clear to the degree that sensibility reveals it as such.[12] Thus the preceding paradox is resolved: even if we grant that the same differential relations are established in all monads, not all of them will attain the same level of clarity, required by conscious perception in conformity with its threshold.

And, above all, we can clear up the two difficulties encountered at the beginning, that is, that the same requirement appeals now and again to obscurity and to clarity, and that clarity itself depends on what is only fathomed obscurely. For clarity has to emerge out of darkness, as if through a first filter that would be followed by many other filters, for what is distinct, what is confused, and so on.[13] In effect, differential relations indeed fill the role of a filter – and already of an infinity of filters – since they let through only minute perceptions that in each instance can furnish a relatively clear perception. But, because filters change their nature at each level, we must admit that clarity is relatively obscure and absolutely confused, just as what is distinct remains relatively confused and absolutely inadequate. What then is the implication of the Cartesian

expression 'clear and distinct,' which Leibniz nonetheless retains? How can he say that the privileged zone of every monad is not only clear but also distinct, all the while it consists of a confused event? It is because clear perception as such is never distinct.

Rather, it is 'distinguished,' in the sense of being remarkable or notable. It is decisive in respect to other perceptions, and the first filter is obviously applied to *ordinary* perceptions in order to extract from them whatever is *remarkable* (clear and distinguished).[14] But, strictly speaking, the distinct presupposes another filter that assumes the remarkable to be *regular*, and from it extracts singularities. These are the inner singularities of the idea or of the distinct perception. Must a third filter be imagined, of the adequate or even of the complete, that draws the ordinary out of the singular, in a manner that the organization of filters would constitute a circular system, although this last filter exceeds our power of imagination? The totality would allow us to utter in the same breath, like Balthazar, 'Everything is ordinary!' and 'Everything is unique!'

The development of the theory of the idea pertains less here than the different meanings of the singular. We have encountered three of its meanings: singularity is above all (1) inflection, the point of inflection that is extended up to the neighborhood of other singularities, thus tracing the lines of the universe mapped according to relations of distance; and then (2) it is the axis of the curve from the concave side insofar as the monad's point of view is defined according to relations of perspective; finally, (3) it is what is remarkable, according to differential relations that in the monad are constituting perception. We shall observe that a fourth kind of singularity can be added, one that makes up maximal and minimal 'extrema' in matter or extension. Already, in the deepest Baroque regions, and in the deepest Baroque knowledge of the world, this subordination of the true to what is singular and remarkable is being made manifest.

Now we can return to perception. All monads express the whole world darkly, even if not in the same order. Each one encloses in itself the infinity of minute perceptions. They cannot be distinguished by weakness or strength. What distinguishes them is their zone of clear, remarkable, or privileged expression. Ultimately, 'totally naked monads' (lacking this zone of light) might be conceived. They would live in darkness or near-darkness, in the vertigo and giddiness of minute and dark perceptions. No differential mechanism of reciprocal determination would come to select

a few of these tiny perceptions in order to extract a clear perception. They would have nothing remarkable about them.

A limit-condition of this kind is present only in death; everywhere else it is merely an abstraction.[15] The tiniest of all animals has glimmers that cause it to recognize its food, its enemies, and sometimes its partner. If life implies a soul, it is because proteins already attest to an activity of perception, discrimination, and distinction – in short, a 'primary force' that physical impulsions and chemical affinities cannot explain ('derivative forces'). Thus there can be no reactions ensuing from excitations, but from outer organic actions that in the soul are proof of an inner perceptive activity. If life has a soul, it is because it perceives, distinguishes, or discriminates, and because a whole world of animal psychology is first of all a psychology of perception. In most cases, the soul gets along quite well with very few clear or distinguished perceptions: the soul of the tick has three, including a perception of light, an olfactory perception of its prey, and a tactile perception of the best place to burrow, while everything else in the great expanse of Nature, which the tick nevertheless conveys, is only a numbness, a dust of tiny, dark, and scattered perceptions.[16]

But if an animal scale exists, or an 'evolution' in the animal series, it is insofar as increasingly numerous differential relations of a deepening order are determining a zone of clear expression that is both more extensive and increasingly hermetic. Each of the conscious perceptions that comprise the zone is associated with others in the infinite process of reciprocal determination. These are *remembering monads*. And furthermore, certain monads are endowed with the power of extending themselves and intensifying their zones, of attaining a real connection of their conscious perceptions (and not a simple associative consecution), and of surpassing clarity with what is distinctive and even with what is adequate: *reasonable or reflexive monads*, to be sure, find their condition of self-development in the sacrifice of certain ones among them – the Damned – that regress to the state of almost naked monads, their only single and clear perception being their hatred of God.

Whence the possibility for an admittedly summary classification of monads as functions of their perceptive qualities: there are almost naked monads, remembering monads, and reflexive or reasonable monads.[17] Fechner, another of the great disciples of Leibniz, and the founder of a psychophysics inseparable from the spiritual mechanisms of the monadic

soul, does not hesitate to develop classifications endlessly, from vertigo or dizziness to luminous life. In them he envisions the three ages of man, with all their possibilities of regression and damnation, through which Fechner himself passes as a monad, reduced to his dark room or his somber depths, turned over to the digestive swarm of tiny perceptions, but also to the force of a resurrection, to an ascendant surge of intense and expansive light.[18] Few monads fail to believe themselves damned at certain moments of their existence. When their clear perceptions are now and again extinguished, when they recede into the night – in relation to this the tick's life appears to be singularly rich. But with freedom there also comes the moment when a soul is won over to itself and can whisper with a convalescent's astonishment, 'My God, what did I do in all of these years?'

If the differential mechanisms of our clear perceptions are checked, then the minute perceptions force selection and invade consciousness, as in drowsiness or in giddiness. A dust of colored perceptions falls on a black backdrop; yet, if we look closely, these are not atoms, but minuscule folds that are endlessly unfurling and bending on the edges of juxtaposed areas, like a mist or fog that makes their surface sparkle, at speeds that no one of our thresholds of consciousness could sustain in a normal state. But when our clear perceptions are reformed, they draw yet another fold that now separates the conscious from the unconscious, that joins the tiny edges of surface to a great area, that moderates the different speeds, and rejects all kinds of minute perceptions in order to make from all the others the solid fabric of apperception: dust falls, and I see the great fold of figures just as the background is unfurling its tiny folds.

Fold over folds: such is the status of the two modes of perception, or of microscopic and macroscopic processes. That is why the unfolded surface is never the opposite of the fold, but rather the movement that goes from some to the others. Unfolding sometimes means that I am developing – that I am undoing – infinite tiny folds that are forever agitating the background, with the goal of drawing a great fold on the side whence forms appear; it is the operation of a vigil: I project the world 'on the surface of a folding . . .'[19] At other times, on the contrary, I undo the folds of consciousness that pass through every one of my thresholds, the 'twenty-two folds' that surround me and separate me from the deep, in order to unveil in a single movement this unfathomable depth of tiny and moving folds that waft me along at excessive speeds in the operation of vertigo, like the 'enraged charioteer's whiplash . . .'[20] I am forever

unfolding between two folds, and if to perceive means to unfold, then I am forever perceiving within the folds.

Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object. Conscious perception has no object and does not even refer to a physical mechanism of excitation that could explain it from without: it refers only to the exclusively physical mechanism of differential relations among unconscious perceptions that are comprising it within the monad.[21] And unconscious perceptions have no object and do not refer to physical things. They are only related to the cosmological and metaphysical mechanism according to which the world does not exist outside of the monads that are conveying it. The mechanism is thus inevitably folded in the monads, with unconscious perceptions comprising these minute folds as the representatives of the world (and not representations of objects).

The idea of hallucinatory perception has clearly undergone a slow degradation in psychology; but because it overlooked the properly Leibnizian conditions: that is, the double – microscopic and macroscopic – circuit, the being-for the world of unconscious or minute perceptions, and the differential relations that hold for conscious perceptions. Hallucination is always duplicitous, somewhat like what Clérambault distinguishes in the chloralic state as hallucinations of 'a small area' and others of 'a large area.' That we were always perceiving in folds means that we have been grasping figures without objects, but through the haze of dust without objects that the figures themselves raise up from the depths, and that falls back again, but with time enough to be seen for an instant. I see the fold of things through the dust they stir up, and whose folds I cast aside. I do not see into God, but I do see into the folds. The situation of perception is not what Gestalt theory describes when it erects the laws of the 'proper form' against the idea of hallucinatory perception, but what Leibniz and de Quincey describe: *When a herd or an army approaches,* under our hallucinated gaze . . . – the event:

> Through the next hour, during which the gentle morning breeze had a little freshened, the dusty vapour had developed itself far and wide into the appearance of huge aerial draperies, hanging in mighty volumes from the sky to the earth; and at particular points, where the eddies of the breeze acted upon the pendulous skirts of these aerial curtains, rents were perceived, sometimes taking the form of regular arches, portals, and windows, through which began

dimly to gleam the heads of camels 'indorsed' with human beings – and at intervals the moving of men and horses in tumultuous array – and then through other openings or vistas at far distant points the flashing of polished arms. But sometimes, as the wind slackened or died away, all those openings, of whatever form, in the cloudy pall would slowly close, and for a time the whole pageant was shut up from view; although the growing din, the clamours, shrieks, and groans, ascending from infuriated myriads, reported, in a language not to be misunderstood, what was going on behind the cloudy screen.[22]

The first stage of the deduction goes from the monad to what is perceived. But everything seems to stop right there, in a sort of suspense in the mode of Berkeley, and nothing authorizes us to conclude in favor of the presence of a body that might be ours, or the existence of the body that would have happened to affect it. There exists only what is perceived, interior to the monad, while the phenomenon is what is perceived.[23] However, a first great difference is marked in respect to Berkeley: the perceived as a 'being of imagination' is not a given, but possesses a double structure that allows for its genesis. Macroperception is the product of differential relations that are established among micro-perceptions; it is thus an unconscious psychic mechanism that engenders the perceived in consciousness.[24] Thus the variable and relative unity of any given phenomenon or another can be explained: all phenomena are collective, like a herd, an army, or a rainbow.

The collection of unconscious perceptions surely has no unity (dizziness), but nonetheless it receives a mental unity from the differential relations that are being exerted, and from a degree of reciprocal determination of these relations. A collection will have as much more unity as there are 'relations among the ingredients,' relations carried out necessarily through thought. The whole question is of knowing if, in ascribing to itself the force to engender the perceived and the unity of the perceived in the monad, Leibniz does not also ascribe to himself the force to engender bodies outside of monads and outside of their perceptions.

Why can't we get along without bodies? What leads us to go beyond the phenomenon or the perceived? Leibniz often says that if bodies did not exist outside of perception, the only perceiving substances would be

either human or angelic, to the detriment of the variety and of the animality of the universe. If bodies did not exist outside of the perceived, there would be less variety in perceivers themselves (that 'must' rightly be united with bodies).[25] But the likely argument is even more bizarre and complex: it is that the perceived *resembles* something that it forces us to reflect upon. I have a white perception; I perceive white: this perceived element looks like froth, that is, an infinity of tiny mirrors that would be reflecting a ray of light beneath our eyes. I feel a tremor of pain: this pain resembles the movement of something pointed that would dig into my flesh in concentric circles.[26]

The argument appears so difficult to understand that precautions have to be multiplied. In the first place, Leibniz is not stating that perception resembles an object, but that it evokes a vibration gathered by a receptive organ: pain does not represent the needle, nor its movement from one level to another, 'such as that of a wagon's wheel,' but the thousands of minute movements or throbs that irradiate in the flesh: 'It is true that pain does not resemble the movement of a pin; but it might thoroughly resemble the motions that the pain causes in our body, and might represent them in the soul.' White does 'not resemble a convex spherical mirror,' but an infinity of 'little convex mirrors such as there are seen in foam when we look at it closely.' Here the relation of resemblance is like a 'projection': pain or color are projected on the vibratory plan of matter, somewhat in the way that a circle can be projected onto a plane as a parabola or a hyperbola. Projection is the basis for a 'relation of order,' or analogy, which can be formulated in the following way:

$$\frac{\text{minute perceptions}}{\text{conscious perceptions}} = \frac{\text{vibrations of matter}}{\text{the organ}}$$

In the second place, that the perceived resembles something does not immediately mean that perception represents an object. Cartesians had testified to a geometrism of perception, but through which clear and distinct perceptions were apt to represent extension. As for obscure or confused perceptions, they were operating only as conventional signs stripped of their representativity, hence of resemblance. Leibniz's point of view is entirely different, since neither the geometry nor the status of resemblance is the same. These are affective qualities, confused or even obscure perceptions that resemble something by virtue of a projective geometry. From then on they are 'natural signs.' And what they resemble

is neither extension nor even movement, but matter in extension, vibrations, elasticities, 'tendencies or efforts' in motion. Pain does not represent the pin in extension, but resembles molecular movements that it produces in matter. Along with perception, geometry plunges into obscurity. Above all, it is the meaning of resemblance that entirely changes. Resemblance is equated with what resembles, not with what is resembled. That the perceived resembles matter means that matter is necessarily produced in conformity with this relation, and not that this relation conforms to a preexisting model. Or rather, it is the relation of resemblance, it is the likeness that is itself the model, that makes matter be that which it resembles.

In the third place, if we follow the preceding analogy, how then does the resembled come forward? How does the material side of the analogy get presented? Appeal cannot be made to a material physical mechanism that would remain identical to the psychical mechanism in the soul, since the latter, because it is inherent to the monad, excludes all external causality. It often happens that Leibniz puts the status of differential calculus in question. For him it is merely a convenient and well-founded fiction.[27] In this respect the question is not that of existing infinity or of the infinitesimal, which pertain as much to matter as to obscure perceptions (they are 'alike').

The question is rather: Is differential calculus adequate for infinitesimal things? And the answer is negative insofar as the existing infinite comprehends neither a great whole nor the smallest parts; nor does it tend toward limits. Differential relations intervene only in order to extract a clear perception from minute, obscure perceptions. Thus the calculus is precisely a psychic mechanism, and if it is fictive, it is in the sense that this mechanism belongs to a hallucinatory perception. Calculus surely has a psychological reality, but here it is deprived of physical reality. There can be no question of assuming it in what perception resembles, that is, by turning it into a physical mechanism, except through convention and by increasing the fiction. Physical mechanisms are infinitely tiny fluvia that form displacements, crisscrossings, and accumulations of waves, or 'conspiracies' of molecular movements.

When defining the essential characters of bodies, Leibniz assigns two of them, the power of diminishing infinitely (by virtue of their infinitely tiny parts), and the power of being in constant flux (to have parts that never stop coming and going).[28] Physical mechanisms do not work by

differentials, which are always differentials of consciousness, but by communication and propagation of movement, 'like ripples that a stone creates when it is thrown into water.' It is even in this sense that matter is full of organs, or that organs fully belong to matter because they are merely the contraction of several waves or rays: the nature of a receptive organ is to contract the vibrations that it receives.[29] It is at the origin of a principle of physical causality, because it gathers together the effect of an infinity of causes ('equality of the full cause and of the entire effect').

Thus there exists a great difference between an always extrinsic physical causality, which goes from one body, to all those from which it receives the effect, to infinity in the universe (the regime of influx or of universal interaction), and an always intrinsic psychic causality, which goes from each monad on its account to effects of perception of the universe that it produces spontaneously, independently of all influx from one monad to another. To these two causalities correspond two calculations – or two aspects of the calculus that, even if they are inseparable, must be distinguished: one relates to the psycho-metaphysical mechanism of perception, and the other to the physico-organic mechanism of excitation or impulsion. And these are like two halves of each other. This does not prevent conscious perception from resembling vibrations contracted by the body, or the threshold of consciousness from corresponding to the conditions of the organ, as Fechner's psychophysics is developed on the basis of the preceding analogy. A quality perceived by consciousness resembles the vibrations contracted through the organism.[30] Differential mechanisms on the inside of the monad resemble mechanisms of communication and propagation of extrinsic movement, although they are not the same and must not be confused.

The relation of vibrations at the receiver introduces limits into matter that make possible the application of differential calculus, but this relation is not in itself differential. The application of differential calculation to matter (through resemblance) is based on the presence of receptive organs everywhere in this matter. From it we might be able to draw conclusions that pertain to the respective interpretations of calculus for Leibniz and for Newton. It is commonly known that they did not conceive it in the same way. Now, by determining magnitudes according to the speed of movements or intensities that form them ('fluxions'), Newton invents a calculus adequate to the movement of a fluid matter, and even to its effects upon an organ. But, while considering that these

fluxions disappear in the growing magnitude of which they are a part, Newton leaves aside the problem of knowing where the different parts remain. To the contrary, Leibniz's calculus, based on the reciprocal determination of 'differentials,' is strictly inseparable from a Soul, insofar as the soul alone conserves and distinguishes the small components.[31] Leibniz's calculus is adequate to psychic mechanics where Newton's is operative for physical mechanics. The difference between the two is as much metaphysical as it is mathematical. We would not be wrong to state that Leibniz's calculus resembles Newton's. In effect, it applies to nature only by means of resemblance, but we must recall that it is the likeness that is the model, and that it determines whatever it resembles.

The deduction has two stages, the one positing the monad's requirement of having a body (primary matter or limitation-matter), the other showing how the requirement is filled (secondary matter or flux-matter). To sum up the second stage, which moves from the perceived to the body: (1) clear-obscure perception manifests a relation of resemblance with a material receptor that receives vibrations; (2) such receptors are called organs or organic bodies, and as bodies they constitute the vibrations that they receive to infinity; (3) the physical mechanism of bodies (fluxion) is not identical to the psychic mechanism of perception (differentials), but the latter resembles the former; (4) using resemblance as a model, God necessarily creates a matter in conformity with what resembles him, a presently infinite vibratory matter (of infinitely tiny parts) in which receptive organs are distributed everywhere, swarming; (5) thus we move from one aspect of perception to another, which is no longer solely the representative of the world but becomes the representation of an object in conformity with organs.

In short, God endows the monad with organs or the organic body corresponding to its perceptions. Thus we are prepared to understand the sum of the theory of the fold. The implementation of perception establishes the folds in the soul, the folds whose monad is decorated on the inside; but these are like a matter that must hereafter be organized in outer pleats. We even find ourselves in a quadripartite system of folding, to which the preceding analogy attests, because perception straddles the micro-folds of tiny perceptions and the great fold of consciousness, and matter, the tiny vibratory folds and their amplification on a receiving organ. The folds in the soul resemble the pleats of matter, and in that fashion they are directing them.

I possess a clear and distinguished zone of expression because I have primitive singularities, ideal virtual events to which I am destined. From this moment deduction unwinds: *I have a body because I have a clear and distinguished zone of expression*. In fact, that which I express clearly, the moment having come, will *concern* my body, and will act most directly on my body, surroundings, circumstances, and environment. Caesar is the spiritual monad who clearly expresses the crossing of the Rubicon. He thus has a body that the flowing waters, a given flow of water, will eventually be soaking. But up to this point, when perception has become the perception of an object, everything can be easily inverted. I can recover ordinary language, or the habitual and empirical order of resemblance: I have a clear or privileged zone of expression because I have a body. What I clearly express is what happens to my body.

The monad expresses the world 'according to' its body, according to the organs of its body, according to the action of other bodies upon itself: 'What happens in the soul represents what happens in bodily organs.'[32] Hereafter the monad can be said to 'suffer.' While in truth the monad draws all perceptive traces from itself, I act as if the bodies that are acting upon itself were acting upon it and were causing its perceptions. Is this a simple manner of speaking, or a deeper problem that can be resolved only through analysis of causalities?

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